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The study of identity offers a possibility to theorise the human 
collectives of world politics, give them an ontological status, and 
discuss how they constitute and maintain themselves. Part one 
discusses social theorising of collective identity along the 
ethnographic, the psychological, the Continental philosophical and 
particularly the ’Eastern excursion’ paths of theorising; Bakhtin, 
Levinas and Kristeva are lauded for jettisoning a dialectical mode 
of analysis in favour of a dialogical one which respects difference. 
Part two discusses how Der Derian, Shapiro, Campbell, the 
’Copenhagen coterie’ and Wendt have brought this theorising into 
IR, and assesses their work in terms of that discussed in part one. 
The study of identity formation should do away with 
psychologising conjecture and focus on the drawing on social 
boundaries and the role played by groups who are ambiguously 
poised between the self and the others^ Collective identities are 
overlapping and multifaceted phenomena which must not be reified 
and studied in isolation from one another.
There are, it may be, so many voices in the world, and 
none of them is without signification. Therefore if I 
know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be unto 
him that speaketh a barbarian, and he that speaketh 
shall be a barbarian unto me.
Saint Paul, Corinthians I, 14:10-11
Choisir le dialogue, cela veut dire aussi éviter les deux extrêmes 
que sont le monologue et la guerre.
Tzvetan Todorov (1989: 15)



























































































The discipline of international relations is witnessing a surge of interest 
in identity and identity formation.2 This development has definitely been 
permitted and facilitated by the general uncertainty of a discipline which feels 
itself to have spent the 1980s barking up the wrong trees. Faith in the old has 
made it easier for the new to break through. And yet, having been foremost 
among the common concerns of social theory for years and years, it is hardly 
coincidental that ’the new’ happened to take the study of identity formation as 
one of its major shapes. The article sets out to trace ideas about identity 
formation as they have evolved around the conceptual pair self/other down four 
different paths. This entails a good deal of rummaging in the broader field of 
social theory. The article then examines how the interest in identity formation 
entered the discipline in full force in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 
conclusion, it is suggested that, by drawing on the literature on collective 
identity formation, the discipline may not only arrive at a fuller understanding 
of the international system of states, but that it may also finally give an 
ontological status to the sundry subjects or ’actors’ of world politics.
Identity formation in social theory
Theoretical reflection on the relation of the self and the order begins in the city-states 
of the Eastern Mediterranean some time after around 1000BC. It corresponds to the 
human understanding that there is a choice to be made as to with whom and how one 
will live - that humans and human lives are and can be shaped by humans themselves,
writes Tracy B. Strong (1992a: 9) in the introduction to a reader on the self as 
a political problem. Those working outside Western philosophy may like to trace 
it back to India (Mauss 1985: 13). Anthropologists like Geertz (1979: 229; also 
Sampson 1989) repeatedly warn against treating western ideas about the self as 
fsomehow ’natural’: ’The [modem] Western conception of the person as a 
bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe 
[...] is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the 
context of the world’s cultures’. When the rest of this article will nonetheless 
^concentrate on Western ideas of the self, the other and identity formation, it is 
for two reasons. First, in Erik Ringmar’s (1995) lovely phrase, modem European 
man and the modem state were bom at the same time, and they grew up 
together. Almost the entire social theory literature on collective identity 
formation depends on an anthropomorphisation human collectives, and the 
human being that is being emulated is very much Renaissance Man. Secondly, 
due to the continued pertinence of its European cultural roots to international 
society and the continued pertinence of international society to world politics, 
’the Western conception of the person’ continues to exert its influence on world 




























































































The history of the Western self stretches back to the Roman idea that a persona 
could have general rights and duties through the idea of an inner life. In a 
sweeping generalisation, Martin Hollis sees basically two orientations, the 
Humean and the Hobbesian:
Hobbes and Hume differ over the concept of a person. Hume [...] can find nothing but 
a bundle of perceptions from which to compose the self. Social theorists descended 
from him treat an agent as a set of ordered preferences, which action aims to satisfy. 
Those of Hobbesian persuation add a presocial atom, whose preferences they are 
(Hollis 1985: 226).
The theorist who specifically relates the question of identity formation to the 
conceptual pair of self/other, however, is Hegel. He refines the idea that, by 
knowing the other, the self has the power to give or withhold recognition, so as 
to be constituted as self at the same time:
Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself; and each is 
for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the 
same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually 
recognizing one another (Hegel 1977: 112).
Marx incorporated this idea in his reformulation of Hegelian dialectics, notably 
when he grappled with the idea of self-alienation in the 1844 Paris Notebooks. 
Whereas Hegel offers himself readily to what I shall further down contrast as 
dialogical and dialectical readings of identity formation, Marx insisted much 
more strongly on the dialectical principle. In the upshot, it was Marx’ version 
of a dialectical identity formation which became the dominant version in 
twentieth century social theory, and this question is constantly foregrounded by 
it: ’The theme of "the Other” - and specially what constitutes the otherness of 
"the Other" - has been at the very heart of the work of every major twentieth- 
century Continental philosopher’, writes Richard Bernstein (1991: 68) Rodolphe 
Gasche (1986: 101) even insists that ’Western philosophy is in essence the 
attempt to domesticate Otherness, since what we understand by thought is 
nothing but such a project’. One could add that it has also been central to at 
least one social discipline, namely social anthropology, and that there has been 
a good deal of interest in other fields such as psychology, sociology and literary 
theory. It is, therefore, only with considerable trepidation that I venture to 
suggest that this theorising has taken four different paths. These are what may 
be called the ethnographic path, the psychological path, the Continental 





























































































The ethnographic path has been tread by those international relations scholars 
who have done work on nationalism, and may therefore be as it were closest to 
home. The basic insight of this literature goes back to Durkheim’s theory of the 
social division of labour, and is this: lineation of an ’in-group’ must necessarily 
entail delineation from a number of ’out-groups’, and that delineation is an 
active and ongoing part of identity formation. The creation of social boundaries 
is not a consequence of integration, but one of its necessary a priori ingredients 
(Durkheim 1964: 115-122; Lévi-Strauss 1978).
In the post-war period, it was mainly left to social anthropology to carry out a 
range of studies of self/other relations, the sophistication of which far surpassed 
what had been done in the other social sciences (for example, Epstein 1977). In 
a classic volume published in 1969, Fredrik Barth et al. proposed that ethnicity 
(and, one could argue by extension, collective identity formation generally) 
could most fruitfully be studied by taking the boundaries of ethnic groups as a 
point of departure. Up until then, studies tended to draw up unsystematic 
catalogues of cultural traits which seemed to be endogenous. Barth moved the 
focus by demonstrating how ethnic groups were reproduced by the very 
maintenance of their boundaries to other groups, who were seen to be 
constituted as other by their lack of this or that trait. In other words, he 
proposed that the self/other nexus be studied as it were from the hyphen 
outwards/inwards, in terms of the boundary markers of identity, which he calls 
diacritica. It is the great merit of this move to wrest identity formation from the 
psychological path, which will be discussed below, and place it firmly in the 
sphere of social interaction. From the standpoint of world politics, however, 
one must warn against the bias inculcated by the subject matter of ethnography: 
when ethnographers set out to study collective identity formation, they will 
immediately settle for the study of ethnic groups. And yet, while the lingering 
hegemony of nationalism makes ethnically based collective identities particularly 
prone to being inscribed with political meaning, there is also republicanism 
(Mouritsen 1995), gender (Olesen 1994), class (see below on the Continental 
philosophical path).
Ethnography’s break with psychological conjecture does not mean that 
psychological insights lose their relevance altogether. An anthropologist like 
Jonathan Friedman (1991: 99) may still refer to early socialisation processes and 
argue that otherness ’begins at home, with our primary others. We become egos, 
it is said, via the internalisation of significant others’ objectification of ourselves. 




























































































excuse for simply postulating this or that psychological mechanism, the other as 
a ’looking-glass self, for example - and neglect the actual research which it 
takes to analyse the formation of particular self/other nexuses. For example, it 
is easy to follow theorists of nationalism like Anderson (1983, also Gellner 
1983) in asserting that the nation is an ’imagined community’. This, however, 
is only a starting point. It is a research question, and not a question of 
conjecture, to decide which are the diacritica that mark a particular self/other 
nexus, between nations as well as between other human collectives.
Barth has recently (1994) remarked casually that ’the selection of such diacritica 
is far less haphazard than I may have indicated in 1969’. But which are they? 
If one takes into consideration the effects of globalisation (Robertson 1992) - of 
a ’world time’ to which more and more collective identity formation sequences 
have to relate - and if one still grants hegemonic force to the idea of the nation, 
then language may be expected to be a crucial marker. As suggested by 
Eriksen’s (1993) study of nationalism, for example, it tends to have a ’modular 
quality’ whereby the imagining of each new nation tends to draw on some of 
the diacritica evolved in earlier imaginings of nations.3
Barth’s insistence on a certain regularity where boundary markers are concerned 
does not of course rule out any phenomena ipso facto; anything may be 
inscribed with meaning as a politically relevant boundary marker. Most 
international relations scholars (but not most anthropologists) were surprised that 
song festivals were among the key diacritica when the Baltic states inscribed 
their collective identities with ever more political meaning - in this case human 
collectives actually sang themselves towards sovereignty. Language has been a 
crucial marker of national identity (if only inversely so: In Arab-speaking 
countries, there exist strong sanctions against making spoken forms relevant for 
written ones, since this is held to constitute an onslaught on the commonly held 
Arab identity which is in all these countries one of the overlapping political 
identities). What makes language an important bearer of national identity, 
however, is not necessarily its distance to other languages relevant to the social 
setting in question. To take but one example, in terms of etymology, syntax and 
pronunciation, the distance between Croatian and Serbian or Russian and 
Ukrainian is negligent compared to the distance between Finnish and Swedish 
or Hungarian and Romanian. This, however, does not seem to disqualify 
Croatian and Ukrainian as markers of national identity (yet, nation-builders seem 
to feel a certain unease about the affinities; ongoing attempts at standardising 
written Croatian and Ukrainian generally imply privileging those variants of 
vocabulary and syntactic whose distance from Serbian and Russians are deemed 




























































































importance means that even states which profess to having the same state 
language will make differences of vocabulary a matter of political identity. For 
example, Austria’s recent protocol of accession to the European Union (EU) 
included a list of 23 objects for which one word (for example, Kartoffel) is used 
in Germany, and another (for example, Erdapfel) is used in Austria. When 
potatoes are referred to in an EU document, it is laid down that both words must 
be given in the German text. Thus, every time an EU document involving one 
of these word pairs will be published, it will have the effect of confirming that 
the German language is connected to two different political identities. The 
dividing line between self and other (Germany/Austria) will be maintained, often 
perhaps without readers being aware of it (that is, it will happen on the level of 
practical and not of discursive competence, cf. Giddens 1991). Other relevant 
identities, for example a German-speaking Swiss one, will not be implicated and 
so not confirmed.
The Psychological Path
The working of the boundary between an ’us’ and a ’them’ is the home turf of 
social psychology, which has belaboured ’ethnocentrism’ and sundry related 
phenomena throughout the twentieth century:
a differentiation arises between oneselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody 
else, or the other-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of 
peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all 
outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have 
modified it (Hogg & Abrams 1988:17).
One should expect the social identification approach to be of immediate interest 
here. It sees self-categorisation as an explanation of how individuals are turned 
into groups:
Just as we categorize objects, experiences and other people, we also categorize 
ourselves. The outcome of this process of self-categorization is an accentuation of 
similarities between self and other ingroupers and differences between self and 
outgroupers, that is self-stereotyping. To be more precise, self-categorization causes 
self-perception and self-definition to become more in terms of the individual’s 
representation of the defining characteristics of the group, or the group prototype 
(Hogg & Abrams 1988: 21).
When I do not intend to discuss this literature further, it is because it is akin to 
the literatures on attribution theory and cognitive consistency which made their 
imprint on the discipline of international relations in the 1960s and 1970s, and 




























































































on perception, belief systems, operational codes, Feindbilder and so on failed, 
it was because it tended to begin and end with a self which was not socially 
situated, and so did not focus directly on the nexus between the self and the 
other (see Bloom 1990 for a recent example). However, there does exist a body 
of Lacanian psychoanalytical literature which redresses this by studying identity 
formation as an attempt to overcome a lack, as a process of desire for the power 
of the Other, that produces an image of the self. Anne Norton (1988) has 
followed this line of inquiry, and has foregrounded and illuminated the role 
played by the socially marginal. ’The categories of self and other’, she writes,
are shown to emerge with clarity as categories only where they are empirically 
dubious [...] Individual and collective identities are created not simply in the difference 
between self and other but in those moments of ambiguity where one is other to 
oneself, and in the recognition of the other as like. (Norton, 1988: 4, 7)
One notes the affinity of Norton’s proposal to study identity formation where 
self and other ambiguously overlap (particularly what she calls ’liminar’ groups) 
and social anthropology’s insistence on studying boundary markers. Norton 
suggests that the capacity to recognise the other as like is tied to a certain 
external, bodily similarity. The political significance of this seems enormous. 
Norton (1988: 28) draws attention to Rousseau’s dictum that the citizen’s body 
is the body politic, quoting him to the effect that ’the words subject and 
Sovereign are identical correlatives, the idea of which reunites itself under the 
single word "citizen"’. The parallel drawn between the body and the body politic 
is then used as a launching pad for an intriguing suggestion:
Accompanying this conviction is another: that likemindedness is coextensive with a 
likeness of physiological constitution; that all men, insofar as they have the same 
bodies, have the same capacity for reason, the same emotions, the same desires. This 
conviction, which has lent particular ferocity to debates over racial and sexual 
difference, denies the role of politics and language in the constitution of the mind 
(Norton 1988:42).
This is an interesting starting point not least for the study of how collective 
identity formations are ’gendered’. The semiotician Yuri Lotman (1990) 
discusses an example which may throw further light on Norton’s discussion of 
the role of the liminar for identity formation. Seventeenth century Russians 
defined themselves among other things in relation to a group which was resident 
on their territorial borders and was known to them as nashi paganv our pagans. 
Being of orthodox religion was the main marker of Russian-ness at this point 
in time-space. Yet the existence of a group which was non-orthodox (pagan), but 




























































































of identity formation and the inherent uncertainty of the categories us/them and 
self/other.
The Continental philosophical path
The Continental philosophical path, that High Road of modernity, is, as I have 
already intimated, paved with Marxian dialectics. One meets the self and the 
other as raw material for a possible Aufhebung in the name of reason and 
progress in a number of different loci, for example in Sartre:
It is strange that the problem of Others has never truly distrubed the realists. To the 
extent that the realist takes everything as given, doubtless it seems to him that the 
Other is given. In the midst of the real, what is more real than the Other? (Sartre 
1957: 223).
As part and parcel of Habermasian ’discourse ethics’, the dialectically framed 
self And other are still with us as unsuspecting victims of the march of reason 
and progress. Here they are ideally lodged in ’ideal speech situations’ - 
abstracted from power and indeed from the multiplicities of social bonds other 
than that of reasoned discourse. It is probably because of this lack of social 
placement that the most striking thing about the theorising which has followed 
this path is its seeming inability to offer new insights about collective identity 
formation. One exception is Charles Taylor’s book Sources of the Self (1989; 
see also Connolly 1985), which provides a magisterial overview of ideas of the 
self in the Western tradition. He proposes that these ideas can be found along 
three dimensions. There is, first, the idea of obligation to others. Secondly, there 
is the idea that there exists an ideal, a fully fledged goal, a pre-given narrative 
into which the fullness of a self’s biography should fall. The two major and 
vying contemporary narratives, Taylor suggests, is that of the hero script and 
that of the affirmation of everyday life: according to the one, the self should 
' assert itself and sore above its fellows, while according to the other, he or she 
should simply go on going on. There opens up a vista for studying different 
j human collectives in terms of the different scripts by which selves and others 
are constituted. Thirdly; there is the idea of presentation of self. Now, 
developments along the last two dimensions will obviously have an impact on 
dynamics along the first. To give but two examples, if what is found along the 
third dimension is a non-reflective mode of self and social order, of the type 
which is to be found in the Homeric poems, then ideas about the other will 
necessarily look rather differently from what they would look like in a reflective 
order. Again, if what is found along the second dimension is basically a hero 





























































































To turn now down the fourth and last path along which theorising of collective 
identity may be found, the ’Eastern excursion’ is not a well-trodden path like the 
High Road of modernity but began as more or less isolated little forays into 
unchartered territory. I shall mention but four of these. Besides trying to theorise 
the self/other nexus, what they have in common is their marginality to the High 
Road and, hardly unrelated, that there has been a surge of interest in their 
writings over the last couple of decades. There is, first, Simmel (1970), who 
discusses the importance of the margin of the collective self, what he refers to 
as ’the stranger’:
The state of being a stranger is of course a completely positive relation [...] The 
stranger is an element of the group itself, not unlike the poor and sundry ’inner 
enemies’ - an element whose membership within the group involves both being 
outside it and confronting it.
Strangers - the sociologically marginal - play an important role in collective 
identity formation, inasmuch as their very presence brings the question of who 
is self and who is other to the fore. The ambiguity of strangers may serve to 
highlight the possible ambiguity between these two categories themselves. 
Norton’s liminars are exemplified and as it were embodied in groups of 
strangers.4 Then there is Schmitt, who maintained that the state defines itself by 
being the unit which distinguishes public enemies (Feind) from friends (Freund). 
If a given state fails to do so, its authority will immediately be challenged by 
some other unit which will take on this burden. Schmitt sees the public enemy 
in our epoch exclusively as a concern of the political unit, which to him is the 
sovereign nation-state. This public enemy
does not have to be morally evil, he does not have to be aesthetically ugly, he does 
not have to appear as an economic competitor, and it can [...] even be advantageous 
to have business dealings with him. He is nevertheless the Other (Andere) (Schmitt 
1936: 14).
If Simmel draws attention to the margin between self and other and Schmitt 
proceeds to pare politics down to the act of distinguishing between them, it is 
Nietzsche’s great contribution to begin to dissolve these categories (Dallmayr 
1981: 27). Nietzsche stressed how the world does not simply present itself to 
human beings, but how the activity of knowing is a formulation of the world. 
This knowing cannot take place from any solid foundation, and so the self will 
know the other and everything else only as a series of changing perspectives, 




























































































other way around. Nietzsche’s Perspectivism assesses ’that "I" am a number of 
different ways of knowing and that there is no such entity as a permanent or 
privileged self (Strong 1992b: 174). At the same time, he warns about the 
dangers of ressentiment. that is, of taking one’s identity from the postulation of 
a negative other:
Ressentiment. bom of weakness, to no one more harmful than to the weak man 
himself - in the opposite case, where a rich nature is the presupposition, a superfluous 
feeling to stay master of which is almost the proof of richness. (Nietzsche 1992: 46).5
If it is a defining trait of all these three more or less to break with a dialectical 
understanding of the self/other nexus, it was left to the fourth to flesh out a 
fully-fledged alternative to it. Mikhail Bakhtin’s work was an attempt to redress 
exactly what he saw as the hollowness in philosophising about the self:
from his very earliest work Bakhtin is highly critical of what he calls 
’epistemologism’, a tendency pervading all nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
philosophy. A theory of knowledge devolves into mere epistemologism when there is 
posited ’a unitary and unique consciousness... any determinateness must be derived 
from itself [thus it] cannot have another consciousness outside itself... any unity is its 
own unity’. In [Bakhtin’s philosophy of] dialogism, the very capacity to have 
consciousness is based on otherness. (Holquist 1990: 18)
That is, ’the Other’ has the status of an epistemological as well as an ontological 
necessity, without which there can be no thinking self. Now, whereas Bakhtin 
thus actively chose to put distance between himself and the broad path of 
Continental philosophy, this distance was further enhanced by the fact that he 
carried out his work inside the Soviet Union. He was removed further from 
contact with the Tradition, even should he have wished to maintain a more 
active relationship with it.6 The importance of all this to the present concern is 
first and foremost to do with how Bakhtin’s theorising of the self/other nexus 
was re-confronted with the High Road of modernity exactly at the time when 
a number of theoreticians veered off this Road in Paris. One recalls that 1967 
was the year when Derrida published no less than three seminal books, On 
Grammatology being foremost among them. And it was at this time, in 1966, 
that Julia Kristeva introduced Bakhtin to a ’Western’ readership. As pointed out 
by Kristeva’s editor Toril Moi, this happened by means of a text which bore the 
marks both of the ’high structuralism’ which Kristeva and others were writing 
themselves away from, and of what was to come after structuralism. It is worth 
quoting Kristeva at some length here:
Bakhtin foreshadows what Emile Benveniste has in mind when he speaks about 




























































































however, bom of a revolutionary Russia that was preoccupied with social problems, 
does not see dialogue only as langage assumed by a subject; he sees it, rather, as a 
writing where one reads the other (with no allusion to Freud). Bakhtinian dialogism 
identifies writing as both subjectivity and communication, or better, as intertextuality. 
Confronted with this dialogism, the notion of a ’person-subject of writing’ becomes 
blurred, yielding to that of ’ambivalence of writing’. [...] The notion of dialogism, 
which owed much to Hegel, must not be confused with Hegel’s dialectics, based on 
a triad and thus on struggle and projection (a movement of transcendence), which does 
not transgress the Aristotelian tradition founded on substance and causality. Dialogism 
replaces these concepts by absorbing them within the concept of relation, it does not 
strive towards transcendence but rather towards harmony, all the while implying an 
idea of rapture (of opposition and analogy) as a modality of transformation. [...] More 
than binarism, dialogism may well become the basis of our time’s intellectual 
structure. (Kristeva [1966] 1986: 39, 58-59).
It may at least be the bst starting point for the study of collective identity 
formation. As stressed by Kristeva, by doing away with the totalising belief in 
progress inherent in dialectics, dialogism definitely offered itself as an 
alternative path along which to theorise identity. Indeed, it seems clear that the 
dialogical understanding of identity formation evolves out of a growing 
dissatisfaction with the dialectical interpretation and the political practices it 
inspired. In the case of Bakhtin, his writing self is directly implicated in this 
break: Writing as he did in a situation where public discourse had been all but 
mopped up by Stalin, and the possibility of public face-to-face discourse had all 
but vanished, he presented the idea that texts could carry on a dialogue with one 
another across time and space as an alternative. Kristeva came to read Bakhtin 
while growing up in Bulgaria, where she was also exposed to a grinding 
grounding in Marxian dialectics. The writing and reception of her piece were 
part of a general reorientation away from modem totalising analysis. I have 
chosen to call this path ’Eastern’ because of the pivotal role played by Bakhtin, 
and an ’excursion’ because of the force with which Bakhtinean and in an even 
greater degree Nitzschean insights grew into a path in their own right and 
curved back to offer an alternative to the Continental philosophical path. This 
isthe story of the arrival of ’post-structuralism. Indeed, in his aforementioned 
tour d’horizon of the intellectual landscape of the 1990s, Richard Bernstein 
goes as far as to juxtapose what is left of the High Road of modernity and post­
structuralism as together making up the ’new constellation’ of social theorising. 
Collective identity formation was a major concern of the new arrivals, as is 
evident, for example, from the way Foucault explained why he had adopted 
Nietzsche’s genealogical pose:
The purpose of genealogy, guided by history, is not to discover the roots of our 
identity but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique 




























































































seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us [...] If genealogy in its 
own right gives rise to questions concerning our native land, native language, or the 
laws that govern us, its intention is to reveal the heterogenous systems which, masked 
by the self, inhibit the formation of any form of identity’ (Foucault 1977: 156, 162).
There is one more reason why I have called this path the ’Eastern excursion’, 
however, and that is to do with the importance for it of the writings of 
Emmanuel Levinas. Whereas Levinas has only reached a broader readership in 
the 1990s, not least his importance as a source of inspiration for Derrida and 
other post-structuralists makes him part and parcel of the general development 
under discussion.7 Levinas himself grew up and received important impulses as 
a practicing Jew in pre-revolutionary Vilna, often called ’the Jerusalem of the 
East’ (Kemp 1992). Like Kristeva, then, he came to Paris from an East not only 
in a geographical, but also in a philosophical sense.
Having just insisted on rooting the study of self/other relations in space and 
time, it may seem paradoxical to turn to a transcendental thinker like Emmanuel 
Levinas for an example of how otherness is treated in continental philosophy. 
Yet, since besides Bakhtin he is the thinker on otherness par excellence, and 
perhaps even less known among IR scholars than is Bakhtin, I will nonetheless 
do so. Levinas condemns an ontological approach to the self as basically a 
violent one, and therefore insists on the need to take a transcendental approach. 
In this way, the story of the self becomes sacred but also social history, 
derivative from the appearance of the other, mediated in language. The face of 
the other summons the self into existence:
To be sure, the other (T Autre) that is announced does not possess this existing as the 
subject possesses it; its hold over my existing is mysterious. It is not known but 
unknowable, refractory to all light. But this precisely indicates that the other is in no 
way another myself, participating with me in a common existence. The relationship 
with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, or a 
sympathy through which we put ourselves in the other’s place; we recognize the other 
as resembling us, but exterior to us; the relationship with the other is a relationship 
with a Mystery. The other’s entire being is constituted by its exteriority, or rather its 
alterity, for exteiority is a property of space and leads the subject back to itself 
through light (Levinas 1989: 43).
This meeting has a timely, historical dimension, inasmuch as the other, because 
of its association with death - that ultimate other whose coming is certain - 
defines the future.8 The other emerges more clearly as a social entity as Levinas 




























































































If the relationship with the other involves more than relationships with mystery, it is 
because one has accosted the other in everyday life where the solitude and 
fundamental alterity of the other are already veiled in decency. One is for the other 
what the other is for oneself; there is no exceptional place for the subject. The other 
is known through sympathy, as another (my)self, as the alter ego. (Levinas 1989: 47)
Once we have fallen to earth, as it were, ontology seems to have re-entered the 
story. There remains a tension between the fact that the other is an alter ego and 
the fact that ’the Other is what I myself am not'. Levinas stresses the possible 
asymmetry of power here, where the I may be rich and powerful, whereas the 
other may be poor and weak. And he stresses that the other cannot be conceived 
of as freedom, because freedom invites either submission or enslavement, thus 
leads to its own extinction. Enters the problem of collective identity formation, 
i.e. politics. The other upsets order, simply by being other, and what to do when 
there is a multiplicity of them?
Indeed, if there were only two of us in the world, I and one other, there would be no 
problem. The other would be completely my responsibility. But in the real world there 
are many others. When others enter, each of them external to myself, problems arise. 
Who is closest to me? Who is the Other? Perhaps something has already occurred 
between them. We must investigate carefully. Legal justice is required. There is need 
for a state (Levinas 1989: 247).
This is where Levinas self-consciously begins to engage with the canon of 
theorising on the modem state. The point he wants to make is about the contrast 
between his own concern and the general thrust of that canon:
But it is very important to know whether the state, society, law, and power are 
required because man is a beast to his neighbour (homo homini lupus) or because I 
am responsible for my fellow. It is very important to know whether the political order 
defines man’s responsibility or merely restricts his bestiality. It is very important, even 
if the conclusion is that all of us exist for the sake of the state, the society, the law 
(Levinas 1989: 247-248).
There is a tension here. On the one hand, his transcendent thinking makes him 
sceptical to the totalising demands of the state, the state of Caesar is ’the last 
refuge of idolatry’:
developing from the form it received from the form it received from the Graeco- 
Roman world, the pagan State, jealous of its sovereignty, the State in pursuit of 
hegemony, the conquering imperialist, totalitarian, oppressive State, attached to a 
realist egoism. As such it separates humanity from its deliverance. Unable to exist 
without adoring itself, it is pure idolatry. This striking vision arises independently of 




























































































Chancellory, with its Realpolitik, comes from another universe, sealed off from 
sensibility, or protest by ’beautiful souls’, or tears shed by an ’unhappy consciousness’ 
(Levinas 1989: 274).
Yet on the other hand, since he does not pry into the case of the state in its 
generality, but into the specific state of Israel, he does not leave the matter 
there. Initially, his is a seemingly universalising move on behalf of the state 
form as such:
The sovereignty of the State incorporates the universe. In the sovereign State, the 
citizen may finally exercise a will. It acts absolutely. Leisure, security, democracy: 
these mark the return of a condition, the beginning of a free being. This is why man 
recognizes his spiritual nature in the dignity he achieves as a citizen or, even more so, 
when acting in the service of the State. The State represents the highest human 
achievement in the lives of western peoples. The coincidence of the political and the 
spiritual marks man’s maturity, for spiritual life like political life purges itself of all 
the private, individual, sentimental chiaroscuro on which religions still nurture 
themselves (Levinas 1989: 259-260).
Yet it immediately becomes clear that Levinas is not simply celebrating the state 
of Israel as one state among many. Israel also has a messianic side, which soars 
above the ’political book-keeping’ of the ’proud West’; it is more that ’a State 
like any other’. (1989: 283). Israel is a state harbouring a great civilisation, and
A great civilization [...] is universal, that is to say it is precisely capable of whatever 
can be found in any other civilization, of whatever is humanly legitimate. It is 
therefore fundamentally non-original, stripped of all local colour. Only those 
civilizations labelled exotic (or the exotic and perishable elements of civilizations) can 
be easily distinguished from one another (Levinas 1989: 265).
Levinas was bom in Vilna in 1906, when it was still part of the Russian empire. 
One of the lasting influences on him from that time onwards has been 
Dostoevskiy, and particularly The Brothers Karamazov, from which he quotes 
repeatedly. It is not hard to see how Alyosha Karamazov’s idea of how 
everybody is responsible for everybody else would appeal to the philosopher of 
alterity, or the similarities between Dostoevskiy’s treatment of the relationship 
between state and spirit (the Grand Inquisitor and the starets) and Levinas’ way 
of approaching that problem. And yet, if Dostoevskiy the novelist is widely 
known and lauded, his political pamphleteer self, as a Great-Russian nationalist, 
is not widely known. Dostoevskiy supported imperial Russian rule not only 
throughout the territory which it possessed during his lifetime, but also went in 
for its further expansion into Constantinople, perhaps even to India. The way 
Dostoevskiy mustered support for these claims among his compatriots was 




























































































century ideas of historical and unhistorical nations, namely that of the all-human 
Russian civilisation:
Yes, the Russian’s destiny is incontestably all-European and universal. To become a 
genuine and all-round Russian means perhaps to become a brother of all men, a 
universal man, if you please. (Dostoevskiy 1954: 979)
If Levinas simply takes Dostoevskiy’s outpourings on the historical mission of 
Russia and applies them to Israel must be further studied; my claim for now is 
simply that their textual moves are similar. The importance of this for our 
undertaking will become clear in a moment. Dostoevskiy constructed his claim 
by maintaining that Russia was more generous and more capable of universalism 
that ’Europe’. He thus invoked a comparison, and established a hierarchy. What 
about Levinas? To him, Israel is the chosen people of the Book because it is 
better at taking responsibility for the other than others:
It is a strange and uncomfortable privilege, a peculiar inequality that imposes 
obligations towards the Other which are not demanded of the Other in return. To be 
conscious of having been chosen no doubt comes down to this. (Levinas 1989: 286).
Levinas is aware of the enormity of this claim, guarding against criticism as he 
presents it by saying that others may see here nothing but a petitioning 
nationalism. Where this reader is concerned, this is indeed so. But there is more. 
According to Levinas, ’the Third’ must stand in relation to the Self and the 
Other as ’a sovereign judge who decides between two equals’ (quoted in 
Bauman 1992: 113). Levinas is on the record as having had a chance to try out 
this role. In an interview about Israel’s responsibility for the massacres in Sabra 
and Chatila in 1982, Shlomo Malka and the philosopher of alterity exchanged 
words as follows:
S.M.: Emmanuel Levinas, you are the philosopher of the ’other’. Isn’t history, isn’t 
politics the very site of the encounter with the ’other’, and for the Israeli, isn’t the 
’other’ above all the Palestinian?
E.L.: My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbour, 
who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you’re for the other, 
you’re for the neighbour. But if your neighbour [ostensibly Lebanese Phalangists] 
attacks another neighbour [ostensibly Palestinians] or treats him unjustly, what can you 
do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy...(quoted 
from Levinas 1989: 294).
It is hard to make heads and tails of this, why this should imply a ’completely 
different’ understanding. In one context, Levinas treats the Jewish people as an 




























































































it takes more responsibility than that collective other takes for it. And yet, when 
presented with a case where this clearly did not happen, the propensity to 
collectivise the other evaporates. Levinas makes the political choice of being a 
nationalist first, and the philosopher of alterity who ostensibly has a 
responsibility to bear witness second. The question arises, then, of whether the 
uneasiness inspired by this shirking of responsibility on the part of Levinas is 
simply the result of an idiosynchracy on his part - his failure to act as what he 
calls ’a sovereign judge’ - or whether it is intrinsically linked to his framing of 
the political. As Levinas is among the authors on whom recent work on 
international relations draws, there will be a chance to return to this question as 
part of the discussion of how the issue of collective identity formation entered 
the discipline.
International relations as self/other relations
If it may safely be said that Levinas does not engage fully with the political, one 
must also note that there is a general reluctance to address the concerns of the 
discipline of international relations in the vast literature on collective identity 
formation. In turning to a discussion of how these insights were piloted into the 
discipline, however, one notes immediately that the first full-length study to 
address world politics concerns did not appear from inside the discipline. It was 
the work of a literary critic, Tzvetan Todorov, who, as a Bakhtinian (1984) of 
Bulgarian background and mentor of Julia Kristeva, was also part of the 
’Eastern excursion’. His book The Conquest of America. The Question of the 
Other first appeared in French in 1982. The book treated the early sixteenth 
century Spanish legal-clerical debate about status of ’the Indians’ of the New 
World. In addition to demonstrating the importance of the meeting of 
civilisations to the discipline of intternational relations (cf. Alker 1992), Todorov 
suggested that one may ’locate the problematics of alterity’ along at least three 
axes:
First of all, there is a value judgment (an axiological level): the other is good or bad 
[...] Secondly, there is the action of rapprochement of distancing in relation to the 
other (a praxeological level): I embrace the other’s values, I identify myself with him; 
or else I identify the other with myself, I impose my own image upon him; between 
submission to the other and the other’s submission, there is also a third term, which 
is neutrality, or indifference. Thirdly, I know or am ignorant of the other’s identity 
(this would be the epistemic level)... (Todorov 1992: 185).
Todorov demonstrated how the relation between self and other cannot be 
grasped on one level alone by comparing the relations of people like Cortes and 




























































































Indians more than Cortés (discussions of whether or not a given creature is 
’human’ or not would also belong along this axis). On the epistemic level, 
however, Cortés’ knowledge of the Indian was superior to that of Las Casas. On 
the praxiological level, both proposed a relationship of assimilation - the 
submission of the other. Todorov’s distinction explodes the kind of easy 
thinking which is based on the premise that, if only human collectives came to 
know one another better, they would also act less violently towards one 
another.9 His typology seems useful. One may, for example, specify the critique 
made of Levinas above by maintaining that his value judgment singles out Jews 
as a human collective possessing a unique mission. I would hold that such a 
view cannot but have consequences along the praxiological axis, for example, 
by inducing a proclivity to disregard Israeli culpability in Israeli-Palestinian 
relations. What a specific self/other nexus would look like in terms of these 
three axes must, however, remain an issue for empirical research, and not a 
matter of conjecture.
If Todorov’s monograph was the first fully-fledged application of the self/other 
problématique to an historical discursive sequence, the monograph which 
extended this kind of analysis into the discipline of international relations was 
arguably James Der Derian’s genealogy of diplomacy (1987). The human 
collectives which served as Der Derian’s selves and others were states, and the 
focus of his analysis was their mediation of estrangement. The tension between 
a dialectical and a dialogical reading of the relations between selves and others 
was a main theme of the first section of this article, where it was discussed as 
a dividing line in social theory at large. Now, I will argue that it is also a 
feature of Der Derian’s work. I suggested that a dialectical and a dialogical 
reading could be seen to be perching uneasily in Kristeva’s Bakhtin article from 
1966, where she traced them both back to Hegel. To repeat a quote, ’The notion 
of dialogism, which owed much to Hegel, must not be confused with Hegel’s 
dialectics, based on a triad and thus on struggle and projection’ (Kristeva 1978: 
58). In Der Derian’s work on diplomacy, the theoretical accent was firmly on 
the idea of alienation, with all the dialectical baggage that term entails. And yet, 
Bakhtin made an unreferenced cameo appearance, a reference to ’this year’s 
Other’ suggested a very much looser relationship between the self and the others 
than that postulated by a dialectical reading, and the book’s conclusion was 
indeed dialectical: ’until we learn how to recognize ourselves as the Other, we 
shall be in danger and we shall be in need of diplomacy’ (Der Derian 1987: 
167, 297, 209). The point I am trying to make is simply that, at the moment 
when the self/other problématique finally reached the discipline of international 




























































































dialogical reading which had taken place in social theory at large some twenty 
years earlier.
Drawing particularly on Baudrillard, Der Derian has since gone on to suggest 
that the entire business of identity formation has become hyperreal and thus no 
longer involves human collectives as others, only simulations thereof: we
[the US] have become so estranged from the empty space left by the decline of 
American hegemony and the end of the Soviet threat that we eagerly found in 
cyberspace what we could no longer find in the new global disorder - comfort 
and security in our own superiority’ (Der Derian 1991: 15).
Another theorist who introduced self/other theorising to the discipline was 
Michael J. Shapiro. Having off-handedly remarked in 1988 that foreign policy 
generally is about making an Other, he went on to apply a number of the 
insights discussed above to questions of war and peace. Clausewitz is usually 
read as having a purely instrumental view of war, as treating it as it were 
epistemologically: An actors reacts to an externally perceived threat in such and 
such a way. However, Shapiro (1992: 460) offered a reading which argues that 
war for Clausewitz is actually an ontological phenomenon, that ’war is a major 
aspect of being, it emerges as a production, maintenance, and reproduction of 
the virtuous self, a way (for men) to achieve an ideal form of subjectivity.’ His 
main textual evidence is a long quote from On War, the gist of which is that 
war is a ’trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity [...] 
within which the creative spirit is free to roam [...] the first of these aspects 
mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third 
the government.’ Now, if it is the job of a government to nourish ontological 
enmity, this makes for a rather different relation between governments than if 
its job is an instrumental continuation of politics by other means.
Shapiro begins to undertake the mapping of the hero scripts which have been 
and are at work in work in international relations. Self/other relations have to 
be understood in their historicity, they are aspects of historically contingent 
ideas of self, which again are rooted in historically contingent ideas about time 
and space. Shapiro gives as an example the way technological change automises 
and speeds up the process of telling friend from foe during warfighting, with an 
unintended consequence being that soldiers die from friendly fire. Another 
example concerns the implications of real-time network news from the 
battlefront for identity formation and questions of political legitimacy.
In an analysis of the nature of the social bond which drew heavily on Lacan and 




























































































In the Sadean scenes, what may appear to be mere cruelty, when one causes pain in 
another, can be read as the desire by the perpetrator to identify with the pain of his/her 
victim [...] Lacan saw Sade as one who helped to recognize that the problem of the 
self is not one bound up with a harmonious nature and the good life but rather one of 
a dynamic involving law and transgression (Shapiro 1993: 117, 127-128).
This is certainly another view than the one presented by Levinas, where the 
other is seen as something in the order of an angel (cf. Lyotard 1988: Levinas 
note)! In such situations, seen from the other’s side of the self/other nexus, the 
others may, as suggested by Sartre, seem to be hell. Yet, by being assigned the 
role of victim, the other is still not denied its humanity. Here is one notion, that 
of there being one single humanity, which has certainly informed world politics 
and which simply cries out to be analysed. Shapiro (1993: 90-100) has since 
briefly turned his attention to the social construction of humankind at large in 
terms of self/other relations when he points out that, under present conditions, 
humankind have to ’man’ two different frontiers. The need to man the frontier 
against the rest of animate nature - which partly, as Norton would have us 
expect, happens as a meditation on the nature of animals seeen as marginal to 
man, apes and monkeys - has been with the species since the time of man’s first 
cave paintings. Furthermore, the growing technological refinement of cybernetic 
organisms (cyborgs, replicants etc.) has added an anxiety in popular culture as 
well as among social theorists about how to delineate man and machine. It 
follows that there is no need to postulate an invasion from outer space in order 
to demonstrate how the largest human collectivity imaginable constructs itself 
socially in terms of a delineation from others.
If Shapiro, having announced that foreign policy is about making others, does 
not proceed to demonstrate what an analysis along these lines would look like, 
this is exactly the task that David Campbell sets himself in the monograph 
Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 
Campbell programmatically quotes Judith Butler to the effect that ’The 
construction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes 
as political the very terms through which identity is articulated’ (Campbell 1992: 
259). The book is a thick description of US foreign policy as a seamless web 
of discourse and political practice which has played itself out through a series 
of engagements with others from the time of Cortes and up to the Gulf War. 
The US self is understood as a narrative structure, and it is argued that ’For a 
state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of 
prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death’ (Campbell 1992: 11). Due to 
the role played by immigration in its genesis, the United States is presented as 




























































































which increases its need of having its representational practices recognised and 
confirmed.
Campbell’s is an ethical concern - he follows Connolly (1991) in arguing that 
the knack is for a human collective to be able to carry out its practices of 
representation while living in difference; that is, without ’othering’ other 
collectives. This, however, is exactly what the United States has failed, and is 
still failing, to do. One of the consequences is that it is perpetually on the look­
out for new collectives to other:
If we take the cold war to be a struggle related to the production and reproduction of 
identity, the popularly heralded belief that we are witnessing the end of the cold war 
embodies a misunderstanding: while the objects of established post-1945 strategies of 
otherness may no longer be plausible candidates for enmity, their transformation has 
not by itself altered the entailments of identity which they satisfied (Campbell 1992: 
195).
Campbell gives a detailed reading of how foreign policy, with its focus on 
border maintenance, is a particularly apposite practice for identity formation, but 
also stresses the internal consequences of this. His reading of early US cold war 
diplomacy and the work of the Washington State Legislative Fact-Finding 
Committee on Un-American Activities, for example, stresses how
concomitant with this external expansion was an internal magnification of the modes 
of existence which were to be interpreted as risks. Danger was being totalized in the 
external realm in conjunction with its increased individualization in the internal field, 
with the result being the performative reconstitution of the borders of the state’s 
identity. In this sense, the cold war needs to be understood as a disciplinary strategy 
that was global in scope but national in design (Campbell 1992: 172-173).
As landmark studies tend to do, Campbell’s overstates the case by insisting on 
its uniqueness. Detailed work along the ethnographical path has shown how 
* human collectives are not more or less ’real’ for being imagined, and for 
sustaining themselves by means of narratives of selves which involve the whole 
gamut of metaphor; they all do. In the light of this, it makes little sense to insist 
that the United States should be ’more imagined’ than other collectives. Being 
the state of an immigrant society, the state could not latch onto territory and 
history - the chronological and spatial dimensions of collective identity - in the 
same way as could contemporary European states. What is at issue, then, are the 
diacritics involved in delineating or ’limning’ the US self from others, and not 
the degree of imaginedness. Campbell, furthermore, admirably demonstrates 
how, after the fall of the Soviet Union, there was no break in the US narrative 




























































































a new ’object’ of enmity which could take its place: drug traffickers and users, 
Japan, Iraq. An opportunity to restructure the narrative of self was missed. Yet, -  
in the era of nationalism, it is at least arguable that such a reification and 
demonification of ’the other’ is business as usual in international relations (but 
to downplay the specificity of USSR/US mutual othering, a constitutive trait of 
the Cold War, hardly adds to our understanding of that particular constellation 
of collective identities). To give but one example, there is the case of the Soviet 
Union of the 1930s. In this case, there was indeed something close to a collapse 
of the internal and the external other, as an even sharper line was drawn 
between the Homo Sovieticus of the future and the tired inhabitants of old 
bourgeois and feudal worlds. By thus separating friend from foe, the security of 
the former would ostensibly be assured; a representative Pravda passus (from 10 
March 1938) held that
By extermining without any mercy these spies, provocateurs, wreckers, and 
diversionists, the Soviet land will move even more rapidly along the Stalinist route, 
socialist culture will flourish even more richly, the life of the Soviet people will 
become even more joyous.
Yet, contrary to stated expectations, what ensued was not an increased sense of 
security of self, but, on the contrary, a heightened sense of insecurity, brought 
on by the very insistence on excluding the foe. Since actions and views could 
’objectively’, that is, unintentionally, benefit the enemy, any one Soviet citizen 
was in constant danger of running the enemy’s errand. The word dvurushnik - 
’double-dealer’ - was widely used to denominate people who were unrightfully 
trying to pass themselves off as friends, but who were shown by some spurious 
means to do the dirty deed of foreign spies and their domestic associate 
wreckers. There was pervasive fear of being exposed as being with ’the other’ 
(camp). The point here is not that the US of the 1950s was ’better’ than the 
Soviet Union of the 1930s in this respect, but that it certainly was not ’worse’.
A question mark of a more general kind could be attached to the empirical line 
of criticism. Do power discripancies and hegemonical status in themselves make 
for fiercer othering, a point often made in discussions of US and European 
identity (for example, Davies, Nandy & Sardar 1993)? This is a theoretical non 
sequiteur. There is also empirical discursive evidence which may be mustered 
against the idea, for example in the construction of a central European identity, 
which definitely evolved from a position of weakness but was no less othering 
for that (Neumann 1993). Assumptions to the effect that the less powerful are 
necessarily less othering may be due to a lapse into a view of power as a 
negative and not also a productive force, and to a general proclivity to blame the 




























































































Finally, the impression of the US as a special and somewhat frictionless case is 
reinforced by Campbell’s choice not to deal with the US practices that resisted 
the dominant narrative of the US self. One of the similarities which warrants the 
use of the label ’poststructuralism, is the insistance that, since meaning recides 
in language, and language is context bound and therefore unable to preserve 
stable meaning over time, contradiction recides in identity formation itself: ’It 
is because contradiction is always anterior to the discourse, and because it can 
never therefore entirely escape it, that discourse changes, undergoes 
transformation, and escapes from its own continuity. Contradiction, then, 
functions throughout discourse, as the principle of its historicity (Foucault, 1974: 
151). By backgrounding heterodox narratives of the US self, the discontinuities 
are shaved away and the impression of a closed down monolithic script for the 
US self becomes much more unequivocal than it would otherwise have been.
Mention should also be made of Campbell’s later work, where he has attempted 
to draw on Levinas for his discussions of international ethics." In his work on 
the Golf War, Levinas’s insistence on ethics as first philosophy is invoked as a 
benchmark by means of which to pass judgement ex post on a US ’we’:
It is the idea of affirming life that is the important criterion - and perhaps, albeit 
ironically, the overriding principle - here; for in a situation of an-arche, of radical 
interdependence, one does not seek final justifications, or commands, or morals, or 
rationalizations, or answers to the ’why’ outside of life, beyond the nexus of being and 
acting [...] precisely because of our' collective failure to acknowledge our prior 
responsibility to the Other, we have - as the case dealing with Iraq forcefully 
demonstrated - backed ourselves into a comer such that military combat seems to be 
the only decisive (although undesirable) option. Had we [...] recognized earlier our 
intrinsic interdependence with the problem we seek to handle, the range of choices 
might not have been so limited (Campbell 1993: 96-98).
One may characterise this as a healthy, self-reflecting antidote to an American 
’can do’ attitude. One may also characterise it is a well-intentioned, sympathetic 
and incredibly vague piece of advice. Perhaps sensing this, Campbell has 
recently followed the lead of Simon Critchley (1992) in carrying out a twin 
reading of Levinas and Derrida. The result is an exhortation for the purpose of 
politics to be ’the struggle for - or on behalf of - alterity, and not a struggle to 
efface, erase, or eradicate alterity (Campbell 1994: 477). Quite appropriately, 
this new reading of Levinas is offered as a ’starting point for rethinking the 
question of responsibility vis-à-vis ethnic and national conflicts’, and as such it 
seems to find a response within the subfield of international ethics (see Warner 
1995 for a response).12 It does not, however, seem to offer new insight into 
collective identity formation beyond the moral call always to reflect on how the 




























































































To return to Campbell’s main contribution, his choice to study only the 
dominant project to pin down an American self is even more surprising since 
state-society relations, which make up one important site for clashes of this kind, 
have been impressively theorised by two international relations scholars to 
whom Campbell and also Der Derian acknowledge a debt, namely Richard 
Ashley and R.B.J. Walker. Tn modem discourse’, writes the former, ’the 
sovereign figure of man, defined in terms of a necessary limitation and set in 
opposition to historically contingent limitations, supplies the constitutive 
principle of both (a) the modem state, as sovereign subject of rational collective 
violence and (b) domestic society, as object domain subordinated to the state’s 
sovereign gaze (Ashley 1989: 268). The representatives of states construct an 
international realm, yet this community is set up complete with smokescreen, 
since it passes itself off as a ’state of nature’ and thus not a community at all, 
yet remains a bounded field where the exclusive competence of statesmen, and 
this practice only, has any business: ’Together the two effects of the realist 
double move set up an irony of no small proportions. They constitute a 
■.community whose members will know their place only as an absence of 
community’ (Ashley 1987: 420). Walker foregrounds the repercussions in terms 
of identity/difference:
The priciple of identity embodied in Christian universalism was challenged by the 
principle of difference embodied in the emerging state. This was perhaps not much 
more than a change in emphasis. But this change in emphasis had enormous 
repercussions. From then on, the principle of identity, the claim to universalism, was 
pursued within states. International politics became the site not of universalistic claims 
but the realm of difference itself. Here lies the essential ground of the relationship 
between the political theory of state and civil society ever since (Walker 1993: 117).
One should perhaps also stress how this development was further elaborated by 
the coming of nationalism. If the setting up of the states system institutionalised 
the realm of the international as the realm of difference, the coming of 
nationalism raised the insistence on identity inside the state to new hights. A 
theme developed by German romantic nationalists, the conviction that 
anthropomorphised nations would live peacefully together once they were 
established as homogenised political ’selves’ through the merging of the state 
and the nation found its perhaps most explicit form in the writings of Giuseppe 
Mazzini (1912: 52):
Natural divisions, the innate spontaneous tendency of the peoples will replace the 
arbitrary divisions sanctioned by bad governments. The map of Europe will be remade. 
The Countries of the Peoples will rise, defined by the voice of the free, upon the ruins 
of the Countries of the kings and privileged castles. Between these Countries there 




























































































Now, this was hardly an accurate prediction. It is, among other things, the 
ongoing falling apart of states and nations which makes for the renewed interest 
in the workings of collective identity. If it has been somewhat occluded by 
Campbell, these clashes of political projects in order to define competing selves 
has been made the home turf of another comer of the field. It has no name and 
is too small to be called a ’Scandinavian School’, but could at least in jest be 
called the Copenhagen coterie of international relations. Acknowledging their 
debt to the theorising of Ashley and Walker (Waever 1996; Hansen 1996), the 
common denominator of the work done on self/other relations by these writers 
is that it focuses on identity formation and self/other relations in terms of the 
clash of different discursive practices. There is, first, the case of how states 
clash with the societies for which they have traditionally claimed the role of 
power container and identity arbitrator (Waever et al. 1993). In Europe, friction 
_  between leaders and polities on issues of migration and EU integration may be 
seen to reveal contending conceptions of security, where the states’ insistence 
on the pooling of sovereignty clashes with the societies’ insistence on 
maintaining the borders between ethnically defined nations. Where Campbell 
sees the US as one discursive practice, such analysis brings out how an evolving 
view of the self as covering a multi-national formation among state-bearing 
strata, clashes with a longer-held view of the self as covering only one nation. 
To paraphrase Campbell’s point of departure, it shows how the very terms 
through which identity are articulated reproduce political institutions such as the 
state and the European Union, and how this is always an internally contested 
practice. With the battles waged in the US over the adoption of the NAFTA 
fresh in memory, it is unlikely that such a problématique should not apply to 
North America as well.
The Copenhagen coterie has also produced studies of how self/other relations 
impinge on the possibilities for international cooperation. The collective self is 
predicated on certain key political ideas - like what constitutes a ’state’, a 
’nation’ etc. - and will try to make these ideas the basis for institutionalisation 
when they partake in political cooperation. As more than one project of what 
could be referred to as isomorphism - the attempted reconstruction of social 
structures in new environments - will invariably be involved, the ensuing 
political can be studied as the very stuff of world politics. Thus, the key figure 
of the coterie, Ole Waever, may insist that this way of studying foreign policy 
offers a fully fledged identity-based alternative to traditional foreign policy 
analysis (see Waever 1994; also Waever 1992, Holm 1993, Neumann 1995, 




























































































This insistence marks a shift in writing practice which is of key importance to 
the application of collective identity theorising to international relations. The 
international relations theorists who have extended this theorising into the 
discipline have insisted on ’speaking the language of exile’, working from ’the 
margins’, ’living on borderlines’ (Ashley & Walker 1990, Der Derian & Shapiro 
1989, Ashley 1989). Exile from, margin of, borderlines to modem practice tout 
court, that is. The analyses of the ’Copenhagen coterie’, however, come from 
a position which is not explicitly marginal in relation to such an all- 
encompassing entity. It contents itself with attempting to write in the margin of 
the main text of the discipline itself.
The text which firmly and unequivocally transposed the question of collective 
identity away from the margins and into the mainstream of the discipline was, 
however, Alexander Wendt’s 1992 article ’Anarchy is what states make of it: 
the social construction of power politics’.13 The way he did it was simple 
enough. The article starts out by identifying the debate between neorealists like 
Kenneth Waltz and neoliberals as the discipline’s central ’axis of contention’. 
The former privilege structure as an explanational factor, whereas the latter 
plunge for process. Wendt then makes two claims: first, the structurationist 
claim that the dichotomy between these two are false, and secondly, that 
neoliberals have no systematic theory of process understood as complex learning 
processes.14 He then sets out to formulate such a theory by drawing on 
’constructivist’ work. The ’constructivists’ are, of course, none other than the 
international relations theorists who have just been shown to have extended 
theorising about collective identity into the discipline. Wendt gives as his reason 
for calling them ’constructivists’ that he wants to ’minimize their image 
problem’, and castigates them for having devoted ’too much effort to questions 
of ontology and constitution and not enough effort to the causal and empirical 
questions of how identities and interests are produced by practice in anarchic 
conditions’ (Wendt 1992: 393, 425). In this way he manages to acknowledge the 
fount of his theorising while at the same time marking off distance to it and so 
make the ensuing theory more Salonfahig for the mainstream to which his 
theory is offered. Wendt then subsumes the identity formation approach under 
the neoliberal preoccupation with institutions, and relates this to the discipline’s 
core concern with anarchy and self-help:
An institution is a relatively stable set or ’structure’ of identities and interests. [...] 
institutions come to confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts, but they 
are still a function of what actors collectively ’know’. Identities and such collective 
cognitions do not exist apart from each other; they are ’mutually constitutive’. [...] 




























































































exist under anarchy. Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first 
and foremost with preservation or ’security’ of the self (Wendt 1992: 399).
The meaning of the ’structure’ of anarchy to states is thus undergoing a constant 
réinscription as their identities change. The intersubjectively constituted structure 
of identities and interests in the system must be acknowledged by international 
theorists as a structural, endogenous and constitutive factor. Now, I would argue 
with Timothy Dunne (1995) that this has been the core concern of the English 
School of international relations for years. Their concept of an ’international 
society’ encompasses exactly such an intersubjective structure as the one 
discussed by Wendt (see, for example, Bull 1977). The great merit of Wendt’s 
analysis in this regard lies in the way he explicitly links this problématique with 
the question of collective identity formation. He then goes on to discuss how 
states constitute one another’s identities by borrowing a key assumption from 
psychological attribution theory (but without recognising it as such):
Conceptions of self and interest tend to ’mirror’ the practices of significant others over 
time. The principle of identity-formation is captured by the symbolic interactionist 
notion of the ’looking-glass self,’ which asserts that the self is a reflection of an 
actor’s socialization (Wendt 1992: 404; compare Bronfenbrenner 1960).
Thus, ’alter’ and ’ego’ mould one another by taking up different ’roles’ and 
playing them out in a ’path-dependent’ way: ’The fact that roles are "taken" 
means that, in principle, actors always have a capacity for "character planning" - 
for engaging in critical self-reflection and choices designed to bring about 
changes in their lives’ (Wendt 1992: 419). Wendt gives as an example how, in 
» a variation of what game theorists call ’Trollope’s ploy’ - to take someone up 
on an offer that has not been made - Soviet ’new thinking’ attempted to make 
’the West’ act in a new way that would allow a new Soviet identity in 
international relations.
So, by kitting out the issue of collective identity formation in the ritual 
’neorealist vs neoliberal’ attire of an International Organization article, Wendt 
managed to eke this concern towards the centre stage of the discipline. There 
was, of course, a price to pay. Attention should be drawn, then, to this price, 
that is, to what now runs the risk of being sacrificed on the alter of what Wendt 
refers to as ’rationalism’, ’systematic theory’, ’Science’. One such concern is 
acknowledged by Wendt himself, when he justifies his unequivocal focus on 
states by insisting that ’Any transition to new structures of global authority and 
identity - to "postintemational" politics - will be mediated by and path- 
dependent on the particular institutional resolution of the tension between unity 




























































































(Wendt 1992: 424). Indeed; as noticed above, this is one of the themes that the 
Copenhagen coterie has made their own. However, Wendt’s state-centrism is not 
in and of itself the major sacrifice. The main problem is not specifically that 
states are singled out as the collective actors to be studied, but rather the more 
general insistence that human collectives are unequivocally bounded actors. 
And then there is the throwback to the psychologising assumptions which were 
so popular within the discipline in the 1960s, and which patently led nowhere, 
when these unequivocally bounded actors are rigged with the psychological 
make-up of a Modem, unequivocally given, self. Wendt explicitly brackets how 
the struggle to delineate self from other in international relations must 
simultaneously be a struggle to pin down the identity of one among many 
possible and rivalling selves. The price is the reification of the very category 
of self. In the event, the possibility of studying the multidimensional formation 
of identity formation is ceremoniously sacrified (ceremoniously and not 
unceremoniuously since Wendt 1992: 394, note 12 explicitly sides with 
’modernist’ against ’postmodernist’ constructivists, thus implying that he treats 
the self as a foundation).
In a later article, Wendt (1994: 386) goes on to make a number of additional 
suggestions, for example that ’Identification is a continuum from negative to 
positive - from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as 
an extension of the self. As demonstrated by Todorov, however, what is at 
stake here - the value judgement made of the other - is only one of three axes 
along which self/other relations may be studied. When Wendt postulates his 
continuum, he runs the risk of reducing the question of the other to one of 
various degrees of assimilation or submission. In terms of ethics, furthermore, 
Levinas’ insistence that the other cannot be conceived of as freedom, because 
freedom invites either submission or enslavement, might be kept in mind. Wendt 
(1994: 389) also postulates rising interdependence and the emergence of a 
’"common Other", whether personified in an external aggressor or more abstract 
threat like nuclear war or ecological collapse’ as factors which may facilitate 
collective identity formation. They may. However, as demonstrated in Shapiro’s 
work on collective identity formation, since the social construction of 
humankind necessarily involves delineation from other animate species as well 
as from cyborgs, the social construction of humankind in and of itself involves 
delineation from ’common others’. Thus, Wendt’s candidates for that role are 
simply extras.
There are problems also with the activation of rising interdependence here, and 
they may be treated together with Wendt’s claim that the transnational 




























































































formation: ’As heterogeneity decreases, so does the rationale for identities that 
assume that they are fundamentally different from us’ (Wendt 1994: 39). Does 
it? Normatively, it is an appealing thought that closer acquaintance makes for 
less othering, yet it is simply an erroneous claim. Empirically, it is refuted by 
the work of a thousand anthropologists. Two points should be made here. First, 
since what is at issue in delineation is not ’objective’ cultural differences, but 
the way symbols are activated to become part of the capital of the identity of 
a given human collective, it is simply wrong that global homogenising trends 
make it less easy to uphold delineation. Any difference, no matter how 
miniscule, may be inscribed by political importance and serve to delineate 
identities, as shown by the example of the Kartoffel/Erdapfel given above. 
Secondly, increase in knowledge about the other (which may go together with 
’homogenisation’) is to do with what Todorov calls the epistemic axis, empathy 
with the axiological axis, and action with the praxiological, and they may not 
be positively correlated. Todorov’s example of how Cortes knew more about 
Indians than did Las Casas, yet he ’loved’ them less, and Bauman’s insistence 
that those who helped refugees from the Holocaust did not necessarily know 
more or think in a particular way about them beforehand, come to mind. 
Wendt’s work had the great merit of propelling the study of collective identity 
forward in the sense that he placed it before a wider IR audience. And yet, if 
his studied insensitivity to the multidimensional character of identity formation 
is taken up by the discipline as de rigeur, it may easily hamper the further 
theorisation of collective identity formation in international relations.
Conclusion
The discipline of international relations may draw on a rich and multifaceted 
literature for its study of collective identity formation, and it may do so in a 
number of ways. Since it is a pervasive theme of this literature how the 
formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with that of its others, and that 
a failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have 
repercussions for the formation of the self, it would be paradoxical to bring this 
article to a halt by excluding certain approaches in the name of a chosen one. 
This notwithstanding, certain insights stand out as particularly important 
analytical ’how-tos’. There are, first, the basic insights from the anthropological 
path, that delineation of a self from an other is an active and ongoing part of 
identity formation. The creation of social boundaries is not a consequence of 
integration, but one of its necessary a priori ingredients. The focus for studies 
of identity formation should therefore be the socially placed one of how these 
boundaries come into existence and are maintained. Students of international 




























































































concern with these types of boundaries needs to be complemented by a focus 
on how social boundaries between human collectives are maintained. Since 
strangers and other marginal elements of human collectives ’embody’ their 
borders, the role played by these elements in the identity formation of the 
collectives at large stands out as a particularly promising concern.
Any social field will harbour more than one type of politically relevant 
collective identities. Particular care must be taken not to prejudice analyses by 
singling out only one type of human collective, say, nations, and neglect others. 
Similarly, when studying for example the self/other nexus of two states, 
attention must be paid to the way those states are at the very same time involved 
in maintaining their collective identities vis-à-vis other types of human 
collectives - societies, say, or an organisation of which they both are members. 
Collective identities emerge as multifaceted, and must be studied as such.
This argument may be extended to incorporate a perspectivist approach, where 
it is stressed that a certain collective identity cannot be privileged unequivocally, 
because self and other are not only mutually constitutive entities, but also 
necessarily unbounded. The self and the other merge into one another. It has 
been one theme of this article how this merging used to be understood 
dialectically - self and other were seen to merge into some kind of a new entity 
as part and parcel of the progressive flow of reason. Some thirty years ago there 
was a shift away from this understanding and towards a dialogical 
understanding, whereby no such goal or even development is posited for the 
exchanges between self and other. A similar shift in sensibilities may be 
observed in the discipline of international relation’s study of collective identity 
formation, since it somewhat belatedly got under way at the end of the 1980s.
In analysing the self/other nexus, it is particularly hard not to ponder the ways 
in which the writer is implicated in what he or she writes about. Writing is also 
a normative concern, and the question of responsibility cannot be ducked. It is 
not enough to reflect on what we do, that is, why we study this or that slice of 
world politics, and why we do it. We must also pay attention to what that which 
we do, does. If our analyses are used in order to facilitate the ’othering’ of this 
or that human collective, say the house of Islam or China, by another, say ’the 
West’, then this raises the question of how we are implicated in the unfolding 
of world political practice. Since consequences cannot be foreseen in their full 
range, perhaps such effects cannot be helped (that, of course, is no argument 
against reflecting on the possibility). And yet, certain analyses - Huntington’s 
(1993) essay on the clash of civilisations comes to mind - seem to offer 




























































































human collective together. Integration and exclusion are two sides of the same 
coin, so the issue here is not that exclusion takes place, but how it takes place. 
If it is proposed to achieve integration at the price of active othering, that price 
seems to be too high to pay. Analyses of collective identity formation should 
contribute, however timidly, to our living in difference, and not to some of us 
dying from otherness.
That normative concern is there, and it loses none of its force for not always 
being heeded. But the study of collective identity formation offers more than 
moral exhortations. It offers a way of studying what the English School of 
-  international relations calls international society as an intersubjectively 
constituted structure of identities and interests which is endogamous and 
constitutive to the international system. There is more. To a discipline which has 
had notorious problems with pinning down its subjects and have often defined 
them in terms of their alleged and abstract ’interests’, it offers no less than a 
possibility finally to theorise the ontological status of the human collectives of 
world politics. Analyses of self/other nexuses hold out the promise of a better 
understanding of who ’the actors’ are, how they were constituted, how they 
maintain themselves, and under which preconditions they may thrive. If these 
are marginal concerns, they are marginal only in the sense that they may best 
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7. According to Critchley (1992: 11), Derrida’s essay ’Violence and 
Metaphysics’, written in 1963, was ’the only extended analysis of Levinas’s 
work to appear in either French or English during the 1960s, and it has largely 
determined the reception of Levinas’s thinking, particularly in the English- 
speaking world. A sigh in that essay prefigures Kristeva’s discussion of the 
dialectical and the dialogical in Hegel: ’Levinas is very close to Hegel, much 
closer than he admits, and at the very moment when he is apparently opposed 
to Hegel in the most radical fashion. This is a situation he must share with all 
anti-hegelian thinkers, and whose final final significance calls for much thought’ 
(Derrida 1978: 99). Clearly, Derrida is also implying himself here. This kind of 
self-reflection on how the other about whom one writes is implied in the 
constitution of the writer is, unfortunately, rare in the discipline of international 
relations.
8. This is more complicated, however, since ’God is not simply the "first other", 
the "other par excellence", or the "absolutely other", but other than the other, 
other otherwise, other with an alterity prior to the alterity of the other, prior to 
the ethical bond with the otherand different from every neighbour, transcendent 
to the point of absence, to the point of a possible confusion with the stirring of 
the there is.’ (Levinas 1989: 179). The passage from the other to divinity is ’a 
second step’ (1989: 246), which need not concern us further here.
9. Todorov’s point of the discreteness of what takes place along the axiological 
and the epistemic axes is paralleled by Bauman’s (1992) suggestion that there 
is no necessary affinity between how humans order social space cognitively and 
morally: People who helped refugees from the Holocaust at their own peril 
(moral spacing) were not necessarily informed by a ’cognitive spacing’ which 
suggested that they would do so.
10. I leave the entire business of whether comparing othering practices ethically 
is possible given Campbell’s stated epistemology; it seems to me that Connolly 
1991: 60 is right in asserting no less than five times over that it is, and that 
Linklater (1990: postscript) is wrong in holding that it is not.
11. Levinas enters IR literature for the first time in Campbell & Dillon 1993, 
where he is unequivocally lauded. The very subdued way in which American 
critical international relations theorists criticise one another and theorists on 
which they draw is also evident in Campbell’s failure to discuss Levinas’s 
reliance on the concept of sovereignty, a concept which is otherwise invariably 
(and in my view rightly) the first casualty in poststructural analysis.
12. The dicipline may also run the risk here of repeating an argument which has 




























































































argues that ’In a world construed of codifiable rules alone, the Other loomed on 
the outside of the self as a mystifying, but above all a confusingly ambivalent 
presence: the potential anchorage of the self’s identity, yet simultaneously an 
obstacle, a resistance to the ego’s self-assertion. In modem ethics, the Other was 
the contradiction incarnate and the most awesome of stumbling-blocks on the 
self s march to fulfilment. If postmodernity is a retreat from the blind alleys into 
which radically pursued ambitions of modernity have led, a postmodern ethics 
would be one that readmits the Other as a neighbour, as the close-to-hand-and- 
mind, into the hard core of the moral self, back from the wasteland of calculated 
interests to which it had been exiled; an ethics that restores the autonomous 
moral significance of proximity; an ethics that recasts the Other as the crucial 
character in the process through which the moral self comes into its own’.
13. One notes the catchiness but also the gratuitousness of this title: in a 
constructivist perspective, everything must necessarily be what everybody makes 
of it.
14. ’"Strong” liberals should be troubled by the dichotomous privileging of 
structire over process, since transformations of identity and interest through 
process are transformations of structure’ (Wendt 1992: 393). The agency- 
structure debate which has dominated theorising in the discipline for some time 
now should make a discussion of what structuration is superfluous here. Suffice 
it to reproduce a programmatic quote from the locus classicus of structuration 
theory: ’There are no universal laws in the social sciences, and there will not be 
any - not, first and foremost, because methods of empirical testing and 
validation are somehow inadequate but because, as I have pointed out, the causal 
conditions involved in generalizations about human social conduct are inherently 
in respect of the very knowledge (or beliefs) that actors have about the 
circumstances of their own action. [...] Consider, for example, theories of 
sovereignty formulated by seventeenth-century European thinkers. These were 
the result of reflection upon, and study of, social trends into which they in turn 
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